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Introduction
China's agreement with the United States regarding accession to the World
Trade Organization (WTO)' challenges Congress to undertake an active
response summarized by the term "Sino 301." China's WTO accession
forces Congress to determine what can or should take the place of the
review of trade and other relations with China, known as the "annual Most
Favored Nation (MFN) review," which was formerly conducted annually
during the 1990s, but was ended by Congress in October 2000.2
This article contends that international trade law and the China-U.S.
WTO Accession Agreement leave room for a system akin to the annual
MFN review. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) can continue to pre-
pare an annual evaluative report on China and recurring Congressional
hearings and potential votes can take place, with the possibility of an ulti-
mate option of a Congressionally-triggered resort to China trade tools to
follow. Changes must occur to make this system workable, and this article
addresses the related intellectual challenge-that of envisioning a new Con-
gressionally-established structure and process for American debate over
trade and other relations with China in years to come.3
China's rapidly expanding economy and its opportunities for Ameri-
can trade and investment, on the one hand, and its exploding trade imbal-
ance and Beijing's mixed record on international relations and human
rights, on the other, have combined to produce a highly volatile American
domestic debate regarding trade and other relations with China. The
annual MFN review provided structure and process to the American debate
about China. It allowed Congress to serve as the forum for this debate,
without precluding the United States and China from developing closer
trade and other international relations. However, the annual MFN review
system depended, to make the debate meaningful, on an adverse vote in
1. The accession agreement is entitled Agreement on Market Access, Nov. 15, 1999,
P.R.C.-U.S. (copy released by United States Trade Representative on file with author)
[hereinafter China-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement or WTO Accession Agreement]; see
also White House National Economic Council, Summary of the U.S.-China Bilateral WTO
Agreement (Nov. 15, 1999), reprinted in 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1888 (Nov. 17, 1999).
2. For a review of the ending of the annual review and the Congressional enactment
of permanent normal trade relations with China in October 2000 (that is, by House vote
in May 2000, Senate vote in September 2000, and Presidential signature in October
2000), see China's Trade Status, 57 CONG. Q. 2926, 2927 (Dec. 16, 2000). For views on
the annual MFN reviews, see, e.g., David M. Lampton, China Policy in Clinton's First Year,
in BEYoND MFN: TRADE WITH CHINA AND AmEiEcAN ImEasTs (James R. Lilley & Wendell
L. Willkie II eds., 1994); L. Jay Kuo, Comment, Farewell to Jachson-Vanih: The Case for
Unconditional MFN Status for the People's Republic of China, 1 AsiAN L.J. 85 (1994);
Daniel C. Turack, The Clinton Administration's Response to China's Human Rights Record:
At the Half-Way Point, 3 TULSA. J. COMP. & ITrr'L L. 1 (1995). The text of the bill, H.R.
4444, 106th Cong. (2d Sess., 2000), the enactment of which ended the annual MFN
review by granting China permanent "normal trade relations" (NTR) treatment, was first
printed in the Congressional Record in 146 CONG. REc. H3662 (daily ed., May 24,
2000).
3. For previous analyses, seeJacques DeLisle, Of Chinese Walls, Battering Rams, and
Building Permits: Five Lessons About International Economic Law from Sino-U.S. Trade and
Investment Relations, 17 U. PA. J. INr'L ECON. L. 513 (1996).
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Congress triggering the backward-looking tool of returning China to non-
MFN high tariff levels.4 The WTO rules no longer allow Congress to
threaten such action. However, that may not matter as much as it seems.
MFN review was just one phase of the half-century evolution of American
trade law regarding Communist countries in general and China in particu-
lar.5 Congress never actually ordered a withdrawal of China's MFN status,
not even in its strong reaction after Tienanmen Square,6 nor did it block
China's quest for WTO accession. 7
What gave weight to the annual MFN process consisted less in the
magnitude of this never-used tool, but rather that Congress could realisti-
cally debate action at all. Similarly, during annual Sino 301 reviews, Con-
gress could use an adverse triggering vote to impose those potent curbs on
China's trade that pass muster under the WTO rules. As this article dis-
cusses, China is not likely to make a rapid and smooth transition to a liber-
alized rule-oriented economy. In turn, China's inability, notwithstanding a
good-faith effort, to come into compliance with its trade liberalization
undertakings gives the United States the option to declare that its rights
have been violated and invoke retaliatory trade options against China.
Thus, Sino 301 legislation could result in Congressional votes seeking the
invocation of maximum trade remedies permitted against a noncompliant
China.
Observers with an intense free-trade orientation, or "free-trade enthu-
siasts," hope that China's accession to the WTO, with the accompanying
elimination of the annual MFN review, would better the relationship
between China and the United States.8 This conclusion stems from the
reduction or channeling of national protectionist reactions to the expan-
sion of trade that General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and
WTO have brought on in other spheres. Conversely, observers with an
4. See generally Paul Lansing & Eric Rose, The Granting and Suspension of Most-
Favored-Nation Status for Nonmarket Economy States: Policy and Consequences, 25 HARV.
INT'L LJ. 329 (1984) (describing the system by which MFN status could be granted, or
suspended, for nonmarket economy states, particularly Communist ones).
5. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, Er AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 1155-59 (3d ed. 1995); Xiao-Lin Zhou, U.S.-China Trade Dispute and China's
Intellectual Property Rights Protection, 24 N.Y.U. J. INTL' L. & POL. 1115 (1992); Robert
M. Dow, Linking Trade Policy to Free Emigration: The Jackson-Vanik Amendment, 4 HARV.
HUM. RTs. J. 128 (1991); Lansing & Rose, supra note 4.
6. For that reaction, see CHARLs TIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PRESIDENCY: THE BusH
ADMINISTRATION'S STRATEGY FOR GOVERNING WITHOUT CONGRESS 11, 196 n.19 (1994).
7. For that quest, see Monica Hsiao, China and the GATT: Two Theories of Political
Economy Explaining China's Desire for Membership in the GATT, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J.
431 (1994).
8. In other Section 301 contexts, the views of the free-trade enthusiasts have been
extensively elaborated. See, e.g., Jared R. Silverman, Multilateral Resolution over Unilat-
eral Retaliation: Adjudicating the Use of Section 301 Before the WTO, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 233 (1996); A. Lynne Puckett & William L. Reynolds, Rules, Sanctions and
Enforcement Under Section 301: At Odds with the WTO?, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 675 (1996).
For the analysis of such an enthusiast's view written on the eve of Congress's vote to end
the annual MFN review, see Brad L. Bacon, The People's Republic of China and the World
Trade Organization: Anticipating a United States Congressional Dilemma, 9 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 369 (2000).
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opposing orientation, or "China-critics," fear that eliminating the annual
MFN review will effectively silence valid U.S. grounds for criticism of
China's trade and other practices.9 This article takes a process-oriented
viewpoint that looks not for how to rule in, or out, either the free-trade
enthusiast or the China-critic orientation. Rather, the article advocates a
statutory process whereby both viewpoints obtain a hearing in annual
debates, thus keeping U.S. policy balanced, flexible, and dynamic.1 0
Since 1962, Congress has constructed a system known by the statu-
tory citations as "Section 301," "Special 301," and "Super 301," of the
Trade Adjustment Act. This system applies to countries within the GATT
and WTO and provides a mechanism by which the United States threatens
trade sanctions against countries not complying with their legal obliga-
tions." Building on the existing 301 system, this article envisages an
amendment to Section 301 specially oriented to trade relations with transi-
tional, formerly nonmarket economies-a Sino 301. In international trade
law, Sino 301 would draw justification from China's special status as a
transitional former nonmarket economy under an accession agreement.
The potential U.S. actions pursuant to a Sino 301 would consist in part of
maximum resort to the WTO-recognized tools of antidumping remedies, 12
countervailing duties,13 and import surge safeguards. 14 Added to this
would be the U.S. ability to declare China a violator of American rights by
9. Daniel S. Ehrenberg, The Labor Link: Applying the International Trading System to
Enforce Violations of Forced and Child Labor, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 361 (1995); Andrew J.
Nathan, Influencing Human Rights in China, in BEYOND MFN: TRADE WITH CHINA AND
AMERICAN INTERESTS, supra note 2, at 77.
10. For how that balance has worked generally regarding American trade unilateral-
ism, see, for instance, THOMAS 0. BAYARD & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTr, RECIPROCITY AND
RETALIATION IN U.S. TRADE POLIcY (1994); AGGRESSIVE UNmRALISM: AMERICA'S 301
TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh Patrick eds.,
1990). For the author's recent study of that balance in American trade relations, see
Charles Tiefer, Adjusting Sovereignty: Contemporary Congressional-Executive Interactions
About International Organizations, 35 TEx. INT'L LJ. 239 (2000) [hereinafter Tiefer,
Adjusting Sovereignty].
11. See Warren Maruyama, Section 301 and the Appearance of Unilateralism, 11 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 394 (1990);Judith Hippler Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade
Act: A Legislative History of the Amendments to Section 301, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1988);
Patricia I. Hansen, Note, Defining Unreasonableness in International Trade: Section 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974, 96 YALE LJ. 1122 (1987); Robert E. Hudec, Retaliation Against
"Unreasonable" Foreign Trade Practices: The New Section 301 and GATT Nullification and
Impairment, 59 MINN. L. REV. 461 (1975).
12. See RALPH H. FOLSOM & MIcHA~nL W. GORDON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSAC-
TIONS 146-48 (1995) (discussing antidumping law for nonmarket economies); William
P. Alford, When is China Paraguay? An Examination of the Application of the Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty Laws of the United States to China and Other "Nonmarket Econ-
omy" Nations, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 79 (1987); see generally PAUL B. STEPHAN III, DON WAL.
LACE, JR., & JULIE A. ROIN, INTERNATIONAL BusaNass AND ECONOMICS 845-46 (1996)
(addressing nonmarket economies).
13. See generally Robert L. Harris, Note, Goin' Down the Road Feeling Bad: U.S. Trade
Laws' Discriminatory Treatment of the East European Economies in Transition to Capital-
ism, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 403 (1993).
14. See generally Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionism as a "Safeguard": A Positive Analysis of
the GATT "Escape Clause" with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CI. L. REV. 255 (1991).
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failing to comply with its trade liberalization undertakings. A Sino 301
would also include a mechanism to encourage negotiations with China of
supplemental bilateral trade restraint agreements. If China takes steps in
trade and other relations that push Congress toward, or actually into, set-
ting off the trigger in its annual review, such negotiated restraint agree-
ments would afford Beijing a way, albeit a painful one, of dealing with the
frictions between the United States and China within a framework of mutu-
ally agreed adjustments.
Part I of this article describes the existing framework of trade relations
law, tracing its key aspects from their origins. This Part includes discus-
sion of the annual MFN reviews, Section 301 regime, previous Memoranda
of Understanding (MOUs) with China, the WTO,15 and the China-U.S.
WTO Accession Agreement. 16 Part II focuses on the function and fit of
Sino 301 into the above framework. It addresses problems likely to persist
regarding China's compliance with WTO and accession agreement rules,
including the problems of state-owned enterprises, local protectionism,
and failure to achieve transparency. 17 This Part then considers tools and
remedies triggered by a Congressional vote or an Executive finding. It
explains the workings of particularly potent tools available to the United
States, such as antidumping remedies, countervailing duties, import surge
safeguards, retaliations for failure to achieve accession agreement
"benchmarking,"'18 and encouraged negotiation of bilateral trade restraint
agreements with China.19
Part III explains why a Sino 301 provision would survive a challenge
by China in the WTO. A seminal ruling by a WTO panel in December
1999 on a major challenge by the European Union (EU) ultimately found
15. For the various Uruguay Round agreements, collectively (and loosely) referred to
in this article as "the WTO," see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal
Instruments-REsuLTs Of: THE URUGUAY ROUND, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994) [here-
inafter GATT 1994]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, Legal Instruments-REsuLTs oF THE URUGUAY ROUND, reprinted in 33
I.L.M. 1144 (1994). For discussions generally of Uruguay Round agreements, see
Charles Tiefer, Free Trade Agreements and the New Federalism, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
45 (1998) [hereinafter Tiefer, Free Trade Agreements]; Charles Tiefer, The GATT Agree-
ment on Government Procurement in Theory and Practice, 26 U. BALT. L. REv. 31 (1997).
16. For a recent review of the law and policies from their origins to almost the final
negotiations for the accession agreement, see MARK A. GROOMBRIDGE & CLAUDE E.
BARFIELD, TIGER BY ThE T IL: CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 8-60 (1999).
17. Sylvia Ostry, China and the WTO: The Transparency Issue, 3 UCLAJ. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN An=. 1 (1998); John Maggs, Can China Deliver on the Trade Deal?, NAT'L J., Dec.
4, 1999, at 3464, 3465.
18. For the significance of a transition mechanism generally and of benchmarks spe-
cifically, see Alan S. Alexandroff, Concluding China's Accession to the WTO: The U.S. Con-
gress and Permanent Most Favored Nation Status for China, 3 UCLAJ. ITLr'L L. & FOREIGN
AFF. 23, 39-42 (1998).
19. For the balance in this context of the roles of the President and Congress, see
Charles Tiefer, Alongside the Fast Track: Environment and Labor Issues in the FTAA, 7
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 329 (1998) [hereinafter Tiefer, Alongside the Fast Track]; Law-
rence M. Reich, Note, Foreign Policy or Foreign Commerce?: WTO Accessions and the U.S.
Separation of Powers, 86 GEo. LJ. 751 (1998).
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the 301 system not a violation of the WTO agreements when construed in
light of the system's practical workings. 20 A challenge by China to a Sino
301 would fail similarly.
The conclusion addresses the implications of Sino 301 implementa-
tion to China and the United States. For relations with China, it would
continue the dynamic balance between Administration-guided cooperation
and Congressionally-guided critical review. For U.S. participation in the
international trade regime, it would continue U.S. balance between Admin-
istration-guided trade multilateralism and Congressionally-adjusted statu-
tory trade unilateralism. These balances would place the United States in
the role of an ambivalent, yet successful, democratic superpower.
I. The Framework for a Sino 301
The framework for new legislation regarding trade with China has three
components: the annual MFN review of trade with China that dominated
the 1990s, the 301 system that has already shaped trade relations and pro-
duced trade agreements with China, and the rules of the WTO and the
accession agreement for China. Each of these elements arose from a politi-
cal evolution. These reflect Congress's historical role as a forum for debate
between U.S. political forces on opposing sides of the free-trade issue.
A. The Annual MFN Review
There were three stages in the evolution of the annual MFN review:
America's initial stance toward Communist countries, the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment of 1974 focusing on nonmarket Communist countries, and
the active employment of that Amendment in the 1990s with respect to
China. This process reflects how, in political terms, Congress became the
forum for debate between U.S. political forces on opposing sides of the
China free-trade issue. From the early 1900s, the United States employed a
dual-tariff system: a minimum tariff for favored countries and a high tariff
for disfavored ones.2 1 After World War II, the track for favored countries-
the MFN status-became connected with successful fostering by the United
States of the GATT international institution and agreement. However, the
Cold War led Congress to maintain disfavored status for Communist
nations.2 2 Nonetheless, during the 1950s and 1960s, Congress allowed
treatment of Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary to deviate from the hostile
trade treatment accorded to the remainder of the Communist states. Con-
gress did so based on a political assessment of those nations' regimes, con-
sidering factors such as its desire to support Tito's separation from
Moscow. Congress did not conduct nonpolitical assessments of economic
20. United States-Section 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R (Dec.
22, 1999), 1999 WL 127266 [hereinafter WTO 301 Panel Decision].
21. ROBERT A PASTOR, CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY,
1929-1976 (1980); Kuo, supra note 2, at 95-96.
22. M.M. KOSTECKI, EAST-WEsT TRADE AND THE GATT SYSTEM (1979); Kuo, supra note
2, at 97-101.
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or international trade law in determining a nation's status. 2 3
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, legislative authorization of trade
relations temporarily ceased as Congress reacted against what it consid-
ered excessive free-trade diplomacy by the Executive branch. This attitude
continued until Congress extensively updated U.S. trade law via the Trade
Act of 1974.24 Additionally, Congress adapted dtente with the Soviet
Union by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.25 The Amendment allowed the
President to extend MFN status to Communist countries, but only after
first determining whether they allowed substantially free emigration.26
Congress enacted the Jackson-Vanik Amendment with the Soviet Union in
mind, without initially considering its possible application to China. In
1974, with China's economy underdeveloped and isolated after decades of
Mao's mistaken policies, trade relations with China received no attention.
However, with the beginning of Chinese economic liberalization in 1978,
the Chinese economy and the potential for significant trade with China
began to grow.27 The Jackson-Vanik Amendment permitted the President
to engage in an annual MFN review process.28 The President was empow-
ered to make annual waivers of the Amendment's requirements, subject to
Congressional override, thereby allowing MFN treatment for countries sub-
ject to the Amendment.29 In 1979, President Carter made the first of a
series of annual waivers of Jackson-Vanik Amendment for China.30 This
waiver continued for a decade with relatively little controversy. During this
time, the Chinese economy made tremendous progress, with foreign direct
investment and foreign trade at its core.31
The era of noncontroversial trade relations with China continued until
the Tienanmen Square incident in June 1989. Thereafter, the MFN review
and related processes became a test of U.S. political attitudes about trade
and other relations with China.32 Initially, during 1990-92, the Demo-
cratic Congress took a harder line toward the Beijing regime than President
Bush wished, with legislative processes exhibiting strong vocalizations of
the political reaction against Beijing. 33 Then, following the 1992 campaign
in which relations with Beijing were a political issue, President Clinton
23. See generally id.
24. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 1411; JACKSON Er AL., supra note 5, at 818.
25. Section 401 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2432.
26. Congress specifically aimed in the Jackson-Vanik provision to condition trade
with the Soviet Union on that nation's allowing SovietJews to emigrate to Israel. PAULA
STERN, WATER'S EDGE: DoMESic PoLIcs AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
28-30 (1979).
27. DiJiang-Schuerger, The Most Favored Nation Trade Status and China: The Debate
Should Stop Here, 31J. MARSHALL L. REa. 1321, 1342-43 (1998)
28. Id. at 1329.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1334.
31. Id. at 1334-38.
32. Randall Green, Human Rights and Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Rates for Products
from the People's Republic of China, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 611, 616 (1994); Jiang-
Schuerger, supra note 27.
33. Jiang-Schuerger, supra note 27, at 1321-24.
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attempted to link the continuation of China's MFN status with improve-
ments in its human rights record.3 4 However, the Beijing regime stood
firm during the following two years against human rights improvements
sought by Washington.35 Ultimately, in 1995, President Clinton separated
discussions of China's human rights and its MFN status. 3 6 Thereafter,
Congress held serious debates and elicited test votes on China's MFN sta-
tus during 1997-2000, criticizing China but never voting to end its MFN
status.
3 7
On one side, this sequence of events reflected a number of U.S. discon-
tentments with China on trade and other relations: perceived shortcomings
in trade relations such as refusals to open key sectors to U.S. investment
and sales, the massive and growing trade imbalance with the United States,
the human rights record of the Beijing regime, and foreign relations issues
such as nuclear espionage, alleged 1996 campaign contributions, and
threats about Taiwan.3 8 Moreover, these dissatisfactions occurred against
the background of a political backlash against free trade on labor and envi-
ronmental grounds and from concerns about the nation's large trade defi-
cit, as reflected in the House's failure to renew "fast track"3 9 in 1997 and
the demonstrations in Seattle in November 1999 at the start of a new
round of WTO negotiations. 40
On the other side, the number of votes was insufficient for Congress to
decide against permanent normal trade relations with China.4 1 Nor did
China's WTO accession become an issue disputed by the major party pres-
idential candidates in the 2000 election. This reflected the political
strengths of free trade, particularly its strong business support. It also
reflected American public sympathy for the Chinese people and their suc-
cessful economic liberalization, notwithstanding the disagreements over
policy with Beijing.
34. Lampton, supra note 2, at 9.
35. Jiang-Schuerger, supra note 27, at 1334.
36. Id.
37. Lori Nitschke, Trade Measure Won't Clear Until Fall; House Backers See a Risky
Delay, Stave Off Annual Move Against China, 57 CONG. Q. 1823 (July 22, 2000) (noting
House vote against ending China's MFN status); Lori Nitschke, China's Human Rights
Record Dominates Debate as House Votes to Keep Trade Doors Open, 57 CONG. Q. 1887
(July 31, 1999) (noting House vote against ending China's MFN status);Jiang-Schuerger,
supra note 27, at 1322 n.7 (noting House vote against ending China's MFN status).
38. See, e.g., supra note 37; Christine Button, Book Review, Democracy Behind Bars:
Forced Labor in the Chinese Prison System: Past, Present, and Perspectives on the Future, 16
B.C. THiRD WORLD LJ. 181 (1996); Andrew F. Upton, The Big Green Stick: Reducing Inter-
national Environmental Degradation Through U.S. Trade Sanctions, 22 B.C. ENvTL. AF. L.
REv. 671 (1995); Green, supra note 32.
39. "Fast track" is the statutory authority that allows the President to negotiate trade
agreements, which Congress approves on a strictly up-or-down basis, without amend-
ments. Tiefer, Alongside the Fast Track, supra note 19, at 329.
40. For a discussion of the 1999 Seattle demonstrations and their effect on WTO
negotiations and China, see John Maggs, Trade Winds Swirling over China Vote, NAT'L J.,
Dec. 18, 1999, at 3618.
41. See generally China's Trade Status, supra note 2.
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B. The Section 301 System and the Previous MOUs with China
The Section 301 system arose through several evolutionary stages. Only in
the past decade has it had significant impact on trade relations with China.
Like the previously-described framework that gave rise to the annual MFN
review, the Section 301 system, too, reflects how Congress historically
served as the nation's forum for trade debate.
After World War II, the United States opened its markets to its non-
Communist allies, including its former wartime enemies, Germany and
Japan, both of which revived as global economic engines. 42 Initially, the
United States accepted the GATT as the chief means of ensuring that these
countries reciprocated U.S. openness. However, by 1962, Congress began
to reflect a domestic political conviction that other countries, particularly
Japan and members of the European Economic Community (EEC), had not
honored U.S. rights.43 In response, it enacted Section 252 of the 1962 Act
authorizing retaliation against other countries' import restrictions of either
illegal or "unreasonable" nature.44 In the 1974 Act, Congress further fol-
lowed these domestic political convictions, exacerbated by a sense of the
shortcomings of the GATT itself and the Kennedy Round agreement.45
Specifically, Congress created Section 301,46 allowing measures to be
taken against countries that maintained unreasonable barriers to U.S.
trade.
In 1988, Congress expanded the Section 301 system significantly.47
In response to the persistent foreign infringement on intellectual property
rights, the 1988 Act 48 added the "Special 301" provision.49 It provided for
identification of countries that infringed on intellectual property rights
and imposed unilateral U.S. trade sanctions if those countries did not
mend their ways. 50 U.S. sanctions could take the form of suspension of
trade agreement benefits or an increase in tariffs or non-tariff barriers
against imports from the violating countries.51 Also, the 1988 Act added
the "Super 301" provision, which allowed the USTR to identify foreign
country practices that blocked U.S. exports and designate them as priori-
42. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 294-95.
43. Id. at 140
44. Hudec, supra note 11, at 510-13.
45. JACKSON Er AL., supra note 5, at 141, 817-18 (discussing developments, including
the Kennedy Round agreement that reduced international trade barriers and strength-
ened the GATT).
46. 19 U.S.C. § 2411.
47. Politically, this expansion reflected the Democratic gains in the 1986 election
(including majority control of the Senate), the eclipse of the Reagan Administration's
stature in foreign affairs following the Iran-contra scandal, and growing trade problems,
particularly vis-i-vis Japan. See Steven R. Phillips, The New Section 301 of the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988: Trade Wars or Open Markets, 22 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 491 (1989).
48. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418.
49. 19 U.S.C. § 2242; Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, "Special 301": Its Require-
ments, Implementation, and Significance, 13 FoRauA Ir'L I.J. 259 (1989).
50. Id.
51. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1)(A)-(B); see also § 2416(b).
Cornell International Law Journal
ties. 52 The Super 301 provision remains the backbone of unilateral U.S.
efforts to force trade liberalization on foreign countries. 53
The U.S. application of Section 301 to China led to a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) in 1992, which recognized the significance of Beij-
ing's movement toward freer trade.5 4 Interestingly, the United States imple-
mented Special 301 against China in successive stages, providing an
example for how the Section 301 system can work in the future in Sino-
American trade relations. In 1989, the USTR placed China on the "Priority
Watch" list it maintains for countries warranting special monitoring to
determine whether to take additional Special 301 steps against them. The
likelihood of sanctions increased following the 1991 designation of China
as a "priority foreign country."55 Under this pressure, China negotiated
and signed an intellectual property MOU in 1992.56
It became evident by 1994 that China did not implement these protec-
tions effectively. The U.S. experience with market access in China in the
early 1990s may be indicative of China's ability to implement the WTO
Accession Agreement. It shows how Congressional enactments (in that
instance, Special 301) can presage the U.S. reaction to China's later nonful-
fillment of a trade agreement (in that instance, the 1992 MOU). This
serves as a model of how a Sino 301 enactment may well predetermine
Chinese-American trade relations under the 1999 WTO Accession
Agreement.
Chinese behavior after the 1992 MOU should neither be seen as out-
right recalcitrance, nor as bad faith on the government's part. China
attempted to protect foreign intellectual property after the 1992 MOU. It
acceded to international conventions and adopted its own laws and regula-
tions.57 A single sentence in the 1992 MOU captured the agreement of the
two countries to "provide effective procedures and remedies to prevent or
stop, internally and at their borders, infringement of intellectual property
rights and to deter further infringement."' 8 China could argue that it
attempted action, but its efforts took place against a backdrop of system
limitations, which, for the most part, impeded its ability to truly curb
abuses. Indeed, with only one sentence of guidance using the general
words "effective procedures and remedies," the Chinese government had
not committed itself in detail to what it would do.' 9 As with other transi-
tional aspects of a previously-Communist state and particularly one with a
52. 19 U.S.C. § 2420.
53. James M. Cooper, Spirits in the Material World: A Post-Modern Approach to United
States Trade Policy, 14 Aht. U. I r'L L. REv. 957, 1003-06 (1999).
54. Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Market Access, Oct. 10, 1992, U.S.-
P.RC., reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1275; Patrick H. Hu, The China 301 on Market Access: A
Prelude to GATT Membership?, MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 131 (1994).
55. RAI BHALA, INTERNAMONAL TRADE LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 1056-58 (1996).
56. Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property
(1992), U.S.-P.R.C., reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 676 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 MOU].
57. BHALA, supra note 55, at 1059-72.
58. Id. at 1060.
59. Id. at 1062.
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developing economy, China simply lacked the pre-existing practical tools
for carrying out the 1992 MOU's commitments effectively enforcing intel-
lectual property rights.60 Furthermore, the 1992 MOU and the implement-
ing measures occurred at a time when China had a long way to go before it
could curb intellectual property abuses.
As with the 1992 MOU, China may attempt to follow the accession
agreement in good faith but, given the context of structural limitations, the
terms of the deal provide little guidance for implementation. The issue is
not whether recalcitrance or bad faith will impede the effort to implement
the accession agreement 61-Beijing is trying, and will try, to comply. How-
ever, the limited guidance China has from the agreement, together with
China's perennial difficulty (that is, its lack of "practical tools") in imple-
menting such agreements, lead to the expectation that China will fall short
of full and smooth compliance.
The Special 301 legislation directed U.S. reaction to China's behavior
subsequent to the 1992 MOU. In 1993, the USTR again elevated China to
the priority watch list and, in 1994, the USTR named China as a priority
foreign country. 62 Interestingly, Congress also followed China's problems
with implementation of the 1992 MOU closely. In January 1995, the Gen-
eral Accounting Office, Congress's auditing arm, published an impressive
study of the problem, which concluded that though China had attempted
to comply with the MOUs on market access and intellectual property
rights, U.S. business interests were still unprotected and improvements
were only predicted in the long term. 63 In 1995, the USTR estimated "that
the damage caused by China's failure to provide adequate intellectual prop-
erty protection or market access for persons who rely on intellectual prop-
erty protection is at least $1.08 billion on an annual basis."64 This
conclusion served as a justification for the imposition of hundred percent
tariffs on Chinese imports worth $1.08 billion.65 China then took bold
enforcement steps by conducting a dramatic raid on a copyright-infringing
(the usual term is "pirating") factory, promising additional similar steps,
and adopting a new 1995 MOU spelling out its commitments in greater
detail.66 Ultimately, the United States did not impose sanctions. 67
It should be noted that the United States followed a similar pattern in
the context of national security considerations. In an attempt to minimize
missile proliferation, the United States joined with other nations in a Mis-
60. Zhou, supra note 5.
61. See, e.g., Thomas Yunlong Man, Note, National Legal Restructuring in Accordance
with International Norms: GATT/WTO and China's Foreign Trade Regime, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 471 (1997).
62. BHALA, supra note 55, at 1063.
63. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OMCE, IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENTS ON
MARKET AccEss AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995).
64. B.ALA, supra note 55, at 1072.
65. Determination of Action Concerning the People's Republic of China's Protection
of Intellectual Property, 60 Fed. Reg. 7230 (Feb. 7, 1995).
66. See BHALA, supra note 55, at 1072-74.
67. Id.
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sile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to prevent the export of missile
technology to problematic countries. 6 8 A major problem for the MTCR has
been China's occasional missile export to Syria and Pakistan.69 In 1992,
China committed to abide by the MTCR but the agreement fell apart in late
1992, as China reacted against the Bush Administration's dramatic pre-
election sale of 150 F-16s to Taiwan.70 As a sanction, the Clinton Adminis-
tration limited the export of advanced technology to China, but, in 1994,
Beijing and Washington reached a new agreement which added greater
specificity to China's 1992 commitments. This prompted the Clinton
Administration to lift the export clampdown. 71
These accounts warrant cautionary supplementation from each of the
two sides in the debate over Sino-American trade relations. Those arguing
in favor of free trade might question whether U.S. unilateral efforts,
through the Section 301 system or otherwise, actually produce beneficial
effects. 7 2 Even to the extent the Section 301 system does have such effects,
or at least does not actively set back the world trading system, free traders
would note that each of these sequences involved well-defined Chinese
deviations from international legal norms in narrowly-defined trade and
national security contexts. These sequences lack the context, like the
annual MFN debates of the late 1990s, of general debate over broad,
loosely-defined U.S. political grievances against Beijing. Free-trade expo-
nents understand such sequences to provide little basis for successful inter-
ference with the world trading regime. Rather, these successes in
influencing Chinese conduct through trade sanctions involve the effectua-
tion of focused U.S. efforts to persuade Beijing to conform to accepted
norms of international conduct in trade and national security matters
rather than human rights or other general political matters. 73
Conversely, China-critics would question these sequences from the
opposite perspective, arguing that they provide little hope for addressing
the kinds of issues presented in the annual MFN debates. Moreover, they
would cite other, dissimilar sequences, in which U.S. threats or pressures
did not deter or reverse problems with Beijing in the human rights context.
One such example lies in the persistent problem of Chinese prison labor.74
China and the United States concluded a prison labor MOU in 1992, fol-
lowed in 1994 by a statement of cooperation. Together, these measures
called for an end to U.S. importation of goods manufactured by prison
68. Robert S. Ross, China, in EcoNoMIc SANcToNs AND AMERUcAN DIPLOMACY 22-23
(Richard N. Haass ed., 1998).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 24.
72. Keshia B. Haskins, Note, Special 301 in China and Mexico: A Policy Which Fails to
Consider How Politics, Economics, and Culture Affect Legal Change Under Civil Law Systems
of Developing Countries, 9 FORD ,uA INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & Err. L.J. 1125 (1999).
73. Ross, supra note 68, at 22-24.
74. A Congressional enactment, Section 307 of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930,
bars export of products produced by convicts or forced labor to the United States. 19
U.S.C. § 1307.
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labor.75 However, it is debatable whether these measures actually reduced
the shipment of such goods to the United States.76 In the broad sense
especially, nothing in this sequence has brought an end to the Chinese
prison labor system in its existing form and the problem remains one of the
most important human rights causes for the United States.77 In sum,
while sequences in the past suggest that the Section 301 system can foster
effective interactions with China, free traders and China-critics alike have
doubts about relying heavily on the Section 301 system.
C. The WTO and the Accession Agreement
By "WTO," this article means both the substantive law and the procedural
and institutional mechanisms ensuing from the Uruguay Round, which
both China and the United States can invoke and must follow. Substan-
tively, these start with tariff concessions and restrictions on non-tariff bar-
riers.78 More generally, two principles apply. First is the principle of
"most favored nation" treatment, whereby whatever benefits a country
grants to any other exporting country it must grant to all.79 Second is the
principle of "national" treatment, whereby a country must treat domestic
and imported products alike.80
In procedural and institutional terms, accession to the WTO gives
China membership in the body which will conduct future world trade
negotiations.81 Trade disputes between China and the United States will
now follow the process established by the WTO Dispute Settlement Under-
standing (DSU).82 The DSU, absent consensual settlement, mandates that
disputes be resolved initially by a panel report, subject to appellate pro-
ceedings. In a notable advance beyond the pre-Uruguay Round GATT, the
DSU aims at a "rule-oriented" process, rather than mere diplomacy, and
provides elaborate arrangements for enforcement of outcomes rather than
dependence on voluntary compliance.83
The WTO provides a system for world trade at a high level of general-
ity. China's agreement with the United States for accession to the WTO
75. BHA.A, supra note 55, at 1333-36; Turack, supra note 2, at 12-15.
76. The United States presented an ultimatum to China in 1993: either improve
your human rights record in seven specific areas, number one being the export
of prison-made goods, or we will revoke MFN Status. Unfortunately, this ulti-
matum proved futile .... [I]t seems more likely that the advantages provided by
the cheap and skilled work force of prisoners in China's labor reform system
will cause China to continue on its present course ....
Button, supra note 38, at 191-92 (footnotes omitted).
77. Ehrenberg, supra note 9, at 417; Button, supra note 38, at 191.
78. BHALA, supra note 55, at 225-45, 261-95 (discussing tariff concessions and
restrictions on non-tariff barriers); id. at 192 (discussing "most favored nation" treat-
ment); id. at 245 (discussing "national" treatment).
79. Id. at 192.
80. Id. at 245.
81. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONsTTUTION AND JURISPRU-
DENCE 72-81 (1998).
82. Id.
83. Id.
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provides a much more specific system for Sino-American trade relations.84
Through its agreement with the United States, China cut tariffs and elimi-
nated various barriers to U.S. exports at specific levels in specific sectors,
such as agriculture, industrial products, services, telecommunications,
insurance, banking, securities, professional services, audiovisual (that is,
entertainment), travel, and tourism.85 China also agreed to eliminate
import quotas generally by 2002, but no later than 2005; to phase in trad-
ing and distribution rights and auxiliary services for most products over a
three- to four-year period; and to implement rules regarding investment
measures.
86
Of particular pertinence to this article, the accession agreement
allowed the United States to maintain key aspects of antidumping and
countervailing duty law, the safeguard system, and voluntary restraint
agreements. Together, these mechanisms maintain the existing system by
which U.S. trade law had dealt with China. The accession agreement pro-
vided that the United States could maintain current antidumping method-
ology and countervailing duty law, which treat China as a nonmarket
economy, for fifteen years after China's accession.87 For the "safeguard
mechanism," it provided a special mechanism for twelve years after China
accedes.88 Additionally, it kept the bilateral textile agreement in effect
until 2008 and provided for application of WTO disciplines, such as
national treatment, to state-owned and state-invested enterprises.8 9
Thus, the negotiators of the accession agreement sought to allow Con-
gressional involvement in China's trade status much as it had in the past.
They established an extended period of at least until 2008, or until twelve
or even fifteen years after China's WTO accession, varying with the provi-
sion for the operation of the existing, or an enhanced, Section 301 system.
This was not done lightly. Beijing was angered at the increasingly strong
operation of the U.S. antidumping provision regarding Chinese exports,
and sought to weaken or eliminate it. Instead, the USTR made a particular
point of extracting a full right for that system to continue treating China as
a nonmarket economy for fifteen more years. The accession agreement
84. Bacon, supra note 8, at 387-95 (describing China's current noncompliance with
the general WTO regime and the new, detailed commitments in the accession
agreement).
85. China-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement, supra note 1.
86. Id. The agreement regarding investment measures as part of the Uruguay
Round, entitled the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Investment Measures, is dis-
cussed in BI-ALA, supra note 55, at 1384; Robert H. Edwards, Jr., & Simon N. Lester,
Towards a More Comprehensive World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade Related
Investment Measures, 33 STAN. J. INT'L L. 169, 171 (1997).
87. China-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement, supra note 1 (section on "Protocol Lan-
guage," subsection on "Price Comparability in Determining Dumping and
Subsidization").
88. China-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement, supra note 1 ("Summary of U.S. China
Bilateral WTO Agreement," at 6 (itself describing the safeguard arrangement as a "spe-
cial mechanism") and section on "Protocol Language," subsection on "Product-Specific
Safeguard" (describing the mechanism that will operate for twelve years)).
89. Id.
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thus fully empowers the United States, and in this context, Congress, to
impose potent sanctions on Chinese trade, provided the sanctions have a
trade-related justification as required by the accession agreement and the
WTO. 90
The preservation of these unilateral features of the Sino-American
trade relationship invites an analysis of the similarities of the annual MFN
review process and a new Sino 301. Congress still will be able to impose
sanctions on Chinese trade provided it has a trade-related justification.
The following Part will consider the extent to which China's problems with
compliance will furnish this trade-related justification.
II. How a Sino 301 Would Continue the Central Aspects of the
Annual MFN Review
This Part begins with a discussion of the problems likely to arise with Chi-
nese attempts at compliance with its trade liberalization undertakings. It
then examines particular remedial actions that international trade law has
allowed, and would allow, the United States to take regarding Chinese
trade.
A. Likely Problems With China's Trade Liberalization
Chinese trade problems likely to occur belong to several general categories.
The key lies in recognizing the lesson provided by the 1992 MOU regard-
ing intellectual property and the 1992 MOU's aftermath, in which
problems could have justified massive U.S. sanctions under Special 301
had they not been forestalled by the 1995 MOU. As previously described,
those problems occurred despite Beijing's attempt to carry out the 1992
MOU. Rather, the nature of the existing Chinese governmental and eco-
nomic system made it likely that implementation would be problematic.
Similarly, serious problems will occur during Beijing's attempts at compli-
ance with the rules of the WTO and the 1999 accession agreement.
1. Local Chinese Protectionism
The problem of Chinese protectionism does not lie fully in the control of
China's national government. Beijing does not run al levels of government
in China, and the national government faces an entrenched system ori-
ented away from compliance with undertakings against protectionism.91
To illustrate, a giant construction company located in Shanghai submitted
a reasonable bid for a warehouse construction contract in another province
but lost:9 2
90. China-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement, supra note 1 (section on "Protocol Lan-
guage," subsection on "Price Comparability in Determining Dumping and
Subsidization").
91. Trish Saywell, China's City Limits, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 14, 1999, at 58 (illus-
trating the reality of local protectionism).
92. Id.
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Unfortunately the customer, a city government, had other ideas ... [and]
chose a small local firm .... "When a local enterprise is desperate for
orders," [said an executive of the Shanghai company], "the local government
will naturally give it priority .... As a nonlocal company, our chances of
winning a public bid are very small.
.... Free-market reforms seem not to have made much of a dent in local
favoritism.93
This story showcases the differences between China and the United
States or European countries. From the outset, Western countries pos-
sessed largely unified and free internal markets in which enterprises in all
localities competed on a comparatively non-protectionist, profit- and price-
oriented basis.9 4 Thus the West had a head start complying with non-pro-
tectionist rules of the world trading system. While local protectionism is
not unknown in the West (until recently, U.S. local entry barriers in fields
such as banking were an excellent example), collectively, Western coun-
tries do not face entrenched, officially-built-up internal barriers to
commerce.
9 5
In China, the opposite is true. During the decades under Mao, indus-
trial development policy did not necessarily plan industrial growth on the
basis of efficiency. Heavy industry was located throughout the country
and not in efficient locations.9 6 From the 1950s through the 1970s this
was justified primarily as a national defense measure to assure production
in the event of invasion, somewhat the way rear-area industrial production
helped the Soviet Union survive the attack by Nazi Germany in 1941. 97 As
a result, China has a system of elaborate inefficient duplication and frag-
mentation of production. This "backward specialization" has not been
cured by the export-oriented economic growth of the past twenty years.9 8
After a half-century of such inefficient siting and subsidization-not to
mention elaborate trade protections to counterbalance inefficiencies-local
protectionism is entrenched in China in a way not found in the compara-
tively unified Western nations' internal markets. 99 The WTO rules penal-
ize countries with systems that prevent them from letting go of internal
protectionist barriers. 10 0
93. Id.
94. Tiefer, Free Trade Agreements, supra note 15 (contrasting general absence of local
protectionism with the particular protectionism possible in local government
procurement).
95. Id.
96. DALI L. YANG, BEYOND BEIJING: LIBERALIZATION AND THE REGIONS IN CHINA 19
(1997).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 72.
99. "[I]nternal trade barriers between provinces or even towns have been a problem
throughout China since reform began, and in many instances they persist." DANIEL H.
ROSEN, BEHIND THE OPEN DOOR: FOREIGN ENTERPRISES IN THE CHINESE MARKETPLACE 136
(1999).
100. Tiefer, Free Trade Agreements, supra note 15, at 66 (discussing, in connection
with the Agreement on Government Procurement, how American state governments can-
not have in-state preferences vis-A-vis foreign suppliers). The problem exists for China
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Second, while Beijing could sign a 1999 accession agreement pre-
mised on opening up those protected local markets, Beijing simply does
not have the ability to smoothly overcome deeply entrenched local protec-
tionism. Due to a deficit problem, the government cannot buy off local
officials. 10 1 As a leading expert summarized, "the broader public sector
nonfinancial deficit by the mid-1990s had been running at an unsustain-
able level of over 10 percent of gross domestic output for almost a dec-
ade."1 0 2 Moreover, Beijing typically leaves and supplements revenue at the
local level, due'in part to the central government's superior revenue-raising
capabilities.' 0 3 Therefore, much of the limited power of the government
purse continues in local, protection-oriented hands.
Beijing's limited power to break down local protectionist barriers only
starts with the national budget. A recent study examining China's ability
to comply with WTO rules noted that "[a] major feature of economic
reform has been the decentralization of authority to the provincial govern-
ment level in a variety of areas including enterprise ownership, taxation,
foreign trade management, investment project approval, and credit alloca-
tion."1 0 4 As the authors observed, "[t]he provinces have vigorously used
these policies to reinforce regional development and the protectionist poli-
cies that had already been in place."'
0 5
A free-trade enthusiast might well question why local protectionism
should be so much of an American concern. After all, the main losers are
the Chinese themselves since both the efficient producers in some regions
of China are kept from competing with the inefficient producers elsewhere,
and the Chinese citizens and businesses in the protectionist regions are
kept from buying advantageously from elsewhere. American business may
simply first attempt to trade and invest in the more open regions and sec-
tors, and allow for the slow process of overcoming protectionism in the
more dosed regions and sectors. This may well prove to be the manner in
which U.S. business reacts to China's problems of compliance with its
trade undertakings. For our purposes, however, the issue is the extent to
which Congress could trigger, if it were to so choose, trade-curbing reme-
dies as the result of an annual review. China's extensive, deeply-rooted
local protectionism amounts to a Chinese production subsidy that Con-
gress could seize upon as justification for remedies triggered in an annual
vote.
under other agreements even without its committing to the government procurement
agreement. Id.
101. NICHOLAS R. LARDY, CHINA'S UNFINISHED EcoNoMIc REVOLUTION 5 (1998).
102. Id.
103. China has been hoping to raise the center's share of state revenue (vis-a-vis the
share kept for local expenditure) to sixty percent. Even then, only about forty percent
would be centrally expended and twenty percent still would be in the form of transfer
grants to local governments. Id. at 105.
104. Richard H. Holton & Xia Yuan Lin, China and the World Trade Organization: Can
the Assimilation Problems Be Overcome?, Asian Survey, Aug. 1, 1998, 1998 WL
13064625.
105. Id.
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2. State-Owned Enterprises
China's single biggest economic problem, looming as a major obstacle to
WTO compliance, consists of its state-owned enterprises (SOEs). SOEs are
typically relatively large enterprises, controlled and subsidized by the state
since Mao due to their tremendous inefficiencies. 10 6 Although SOEs pro-
duce a shrinking portion of China's gross domestic product (GDP) (down
to one-third in 1995) they employ 110 million workers, about two-thirds of
the urban labor force, and own about two-thirds of the nation's entire stock
of productive assets. 1' 7
In 1998, when Zhu Rongji became Premier, he made a much-publi-
cized promise to revitalize the SOEs in three years.' 0 8 However, as the
press has noticed, "in reforming the state sector, China's leaders have run
up against a brick wall."10 9 Previous attempts to liquidate money-losing
SOEs through bankruptcy proceedings" 0 have not worked. In addition to
paying employees, SOEs also provide basic services to workers' families.
As a result, it is estimated that SOEs affect over 300 million people in
China's cities.1 1
China's attempt to minimize SOEs to meet WTO requirements
resulted in unemployment in the tens of millions beginning in 1998.112
Workers dismissed following bankruptcies held demonstrations, 1 3 sug-
gesting broad scale disturbances if the liquidation effort continued. Today,
the government continues to subsidize the SOEs, either directly or by
requiring banks to make compulsory loans which will not be repaid. 1 4 As
a result, China's leading state banks are technically insolvent with some
$1.2 trillion in bad loans on their books that turned sour before 1995.115
The enormous SOE sector poses many problems to China's WTO and
accession agreement compliance efforts. China's state banks' SOE sector
subsidization amounts to an effective state subsidy for enterprises that
compete with foreign business or with new business that foreign invest-
ment might create. SOEs predominate in economic sectors such as heavy
industry, wholesale, and retail trade, with which the accession agreement
106. L.ARY, supra note 101, at 26-29.
107. Id.
108. Xinquiang Sun, Reform of China's State-Owned Enterprises: A Legal Perspective,
31 ST. MARY's LJ. 19, 46 (1999).
109. The Real Leap Forward, EcONOMisT, Nov. 20, 1999, available at LEXIS, News
database, Econ file.
110. See generally Mark E. Monfort, Reform of the State-Owned Enterprises and the
Bankruptcy Law in the People's Republic of China, 22 OKLA. Crry U. L. REv. 1067 (1977).
111. "[I]t is well recognized that SOEs in China function as the social safety net for
much of the citizenry." GROOMBRIDGE & BARFIELD, supra note 16, at 27.
112. "Beijing has ordered state-owned enterprises to shed another 10 million employ-
ees this year, in addition to the 30 million already axed since 1998." Clay Chandler,
WTO Membership Imperils China's Industrial Dinosaurs, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2000, at
Al, A17.
113. Sun, supra note 108, at 24.
114. Problems Left Over from History, EcoNoMisT, Dec. 11, 1999, available at LEXIS,
News database, Econ file.
115. Id.
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expressly anticipates that U.S. business will compete. 116 At best, it will
take time for China to withdraw the subsidies from the SOEs and liquidate
those which could not compete; at worst, this process will proceed as
slowly as it has for the past decade. Either way, China will not end its
WTO-violating state subsidies anytime soon.
The accession agreement classified SOEs as entities which must inter-
act with U.S. businesses like commercial enterprises-that is, they are sub-
ject to stringent WTO requirements and remedies. 117 This may have
solved an oft-disputed legal point, but it virtually ensures China will not be
able to comply with the WTO and accession agreement requirements. For
example, the state-owned system of wholesale and retail businesses is not
structured in a manner that will allow it to quickly start competing, or
contracting, with distribution systems set up by U.S. businesses. China's
state-owned distribution system lacks the management and accounting sys-
tems compatible with the global economy.
Again, a free-trade enthusiast might well ask why the United States
should complain so much about China's slowness in solving the subsi-
dized-SOE problem. The gigantic problem of the unproductive state-owned
sector imposes far worse burdens on the Chinese themselves than on U.S.
businesses. Indeed, it is entirely possible that in the not-too-distant future
China's state banking system might actually collapse from the burden of its
non-performing SOE loans.' 18 The volume of non-performing loans trans-
late into bank losses equal to about twenty percent of China's GDP, against
bank capital of less than two percent of GDP. 119 These statistics suggest a
problem reminiscent of the savings and loan crisis experienced in the
United States a decade ago, but the eventual collapse will be far worse for
China as state banks there are proportionately much more important than
the savings and loan institutions were in the United States. Such a col-
lapse, and even the threat of it, poses a far greater problem for the Chinese,
whose savings are in those banks and whose very economic life is at issue,
than for foreign business with its reliance on overseas financial
institutions.120
In fact, U.S. business will likely attempt to steer clear of the SOEs and
the state banking system, preferring instead China's slow reform to deal
with the problems between the two. U.S. business should concern itself
with other commitments much more central to its own trade and invest-
ment prospects, rather than involve itself with the dismantling of the SOEs.
For our purposes, however, the issue is the extent to which Congress could
trigger, if it were to choose, trade-curbing remedies as the result of an
annual review. Nonetheless, China's SOE problem, like its local protection-
116. CHINA-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement, supra note 1.
117. Id.
118. "Beyond three years or so, however, only fundamental reform can avert a sys-
temic banking crisis." Problems Left Over from History, supra note 114.
119. Gary Hufbauer, China as an Economic Actor on the World Stage: An Overview, in
CHINA IN THE WORLD TRADING SYsTEm 47, 49 (Frederick M. Abbott ed., 1998).
120. Problems Left Over from History, supra note 114.
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ism, amounts to a subsidy of Chinese production that Congress could seize
upon as justification for remedies triggered in a Sino 301 vote.
3. Nontransparent, Arbitrary, and Sometimes Corrupt121 Administration
The WTO rules put a premium on transparent trade regulations. As a
result, China must address the highly opaque nature of its system; this
should prove a virtual impossibility in the short run.122 A European Union
study found that in nearly all areas of economic administration, Chinese
trade regulations are nontransparent: "There is a clear lack of written rules,
and where they exist they are subject to change and interpretation by
numerous government and provincial agencies and officials."'123 Paradoxi-
cally, the study also suggested that some U.S. businesses expect to benefit
from trade with China while these barriers still exist. From this perspec-
tive, the nontransparent "policies make China virtually impenetrable to all
but the largest multinational corporations that are able to make substantial
investments at considerable risk."124
The weak Chinese legal system is a particular obstacle to WTO acces-
sion. Grouped together, the problems include the absence of the concept
of supremacy of law due to the superior power of the bureaucracy and of
the Communist Party; ambiguity in the law; shortage of trained lawyers;
and the significance, much greater than official law, of guanxi (relation-
ships, or connections) in everyday commercial activities.125 Concretely, in
an annual inventory of trade barriers, the USTR recited such problems as
the unpredictable application of tariffs, lack of uniformity in customs valu-
ation practices, and lack of a clear consistent framework of laws and regu-
lations as some of China's most significant obstacles. 126
A 1998 study concluded that "[w]hen China finally gains admission to
the WTO, the world is not likely to see China adjust its behavior as readily
as any agreement requires." 127 The study noted that the "practices of con-
cern to the WTO are deeply embedded in institutional conditions
that . . . will significantly retard the actual implementation of WTO
terms."128 Another author commented that: "Real adherence and compli-
ance with procedural and structural obligations relating to the rule of law
is likely to take time and need to evolve over many years." 129 A press
report drawing on a previously-quoted European Union study described
the practical impact of corruption in customs administration on trade:
121. GREG MASTEL, THE RISE OF THE CHINESE ECONOMY 80-81 (1997).
122. See GROOMBRIDGE & BARFIELD, supra note 16, at 20-23.
123. David Biederman, Slow Boat to China, TRAIIc WORLD, Apr. 19, 1999, at 29
(quoting "the European Union's Trade Barriers Database").
124. Id. (quoting "the European Union's Trade Barriers Database").
125. Holton & Lin, supra note 104, at 746-51.
126. Rossella Brevetti, Trade Policy: USTR Report Cites Significant Foreign Trade Barri-
ers in 1999, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 583 (Apr. 7, 1999).
127. Holton & Lin, supra note 104, at 746.
128. Id.
129. Thomas Cottier, Emerging Doctrines of Good Governance: The Impact of the WTO
and China's Accession, in CHINA IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 119, at 119,
126.
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Customs valuation was cited as a nontransparent, arbitrary process in
China. The same product may be subject to different rates of duty at differ-
ent entry points. There is often discretion at the local level as to whether to
charge exporters the official rate of duty for goods, resulting in frequent
bribes ....
Like many other nations, China uses product standards and certifica-
tion as a significant nontariff trade barrier. Obtaining a quality license,
according to the EU study, is a "time-consuming and expensive process."
Foreign goods are often subject to higher standards than domestic goods.
The standards themselves are often unavailable to the exporter for review
and are applied arbitrarily.
130
Corruption in Chinese business is a serious problem. One study
observed that "kickbacks, bribes, favors, rough collection tactics, and other
irregularities are ubiquitous." 131 Foreign businesses in China often com-
plain of "tax authorities who find 'irregularities' that portend serious fines
and penalties unless the [foreign enterprise] agrees to use specific 'tax con-
sultancies' to assess the situation, at a fee .... [e.g.,] a retired local govern-
ment official[,I . . . [is] today a very common means of extracting
payoffs."'1
3 2
Again, a free-trade enthusiast may ask why the United States would
focus on the nontransparency problem. While U.S. business does not like
the problem, large U.S. multinational corporations know how to deal with
it. "American firms in particular are well versed in skirting legality" in
China by making payments through local partners or agents.133 These
activities are handled this way because violations of "the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA) can cause them trouble at home."' 3 4
The weakness of the Chinese legal system has special significance in
considering a Congressional enactment like Sino 301. Some aspects of the
Chinese situation may elicit relatively greater sympathy or tolerance among
members of Congress. 135 Americans may feel either sympathy for or, at
worst, indifference toward China's slowness in solving its SOE problem,
regarding such slowness as merciful toward the tens of millions of Chinese
families whose lives would be disrupted by a rapid change.
Conversely, the arbitrariness and corruption in the Chinese legal sys-
tem does not elicit sympathy from the American public or its political lead-
ers. Arbitrariness and corruption were difficult for Americans to accept
even when it Was deemed necessary for national security, such as when the
regimes of which they were a feature were deemed vital Cold War allies (for
instance, the Marcos regime in the Philippines or the successive regimes in
South Vietnam during the Vietnam War). The slowness of change in the
130. Biederman, supra note 123.
131. ROSEN, supra note 99, at 111.
132. Id. at 147.
133. Id. at 220.
134. Id.
135. From the post-World War 11 Marshall plan that spurred European economic
recovery to the Brady-bond reorganization that lightened the 1980s debt burden of Latin
America, the United States has supported the efforts of other nations to lift themselves
out of economic problems.
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arbitrary or corrupt workings of a non-democratic Communist regime will
be particularly difficult for Americans to tolerate, as illustrated by the
extreme reaction to the 1996 campaign finance matter, in which Chinese
figures allegedly contributed indirectly to U.S. campaign funds. As an
aspect of noncompliance with WTO rules and the accession agreement,
nontransparency illustrates the type of issues which the United States may
typically allow to be worked out slowly through ordinary channels of dis-
cussion, but which could provide a basis for a Congressional trigger in an
annual review.
B. Tools and Remedies that a Sino 301 Could Trigger
The parts of a Sino 301 process that resemble the annual MFN process-
Executive findings, Congressional debates, potential Congressional votes-
need the least explanation since their mechanics would follow existing law.
The remedies controlled by the new trigger merit the most explanation.
These are the tools and remedies that the WTO and the accession agree-
ment allow and, in key respects, even encourage for the specific problem of
China as a transitional nonmarket economy. Such tools and remedies
include enhanced use of antidumping and countervailing duties and
import surge safeguards, "benchmarking" Chinese progress in fulfilling
trade commitments, and negotiation of Chinese-American trade restraint
agreements.
1. Enhanced Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Remedies
This section presents the history of antidumping and countervailing duty
remedies for imports from nonmarket economies, and particularly, in
recent years, from China. The section then turns to a discussion of potent
remedies that could underlie a Sino 301 trigger.
The United States first enacted antidumping laws in 1916 and 1921;
both of these laws continue in effect today. 13 6 Further, both the GATT and
the WTO recognized the right of countries to enforce antidumping laws. 137
Antidumping laws have the basic purpose of maintaining fair pricing of
imports to level the playing field between foreign and U.S. producers.
Dumping occurs when an exporter sells merchandise in the importing
country at less than fair value or below the price of production. 138 When
this causes or threatens injury in an importing country, that country can
impose an antidumping duty in the amount of the dumping margin. 139
Application of antidumping law to nonmarket economies (NMEs)
poses unique problems. A dumping case in a market economy may
depend on the home market prices for the exported products and the fac-
tors of their production; a dumping case for a nonmarket economy cannot,
because of the absence of the usual market-disciplined significance of the
136. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-72.
137. Joseph A. Laroski, Jr., NMES: A Love Story- Nonmarket and Market Economy Sta-
tus Under U.S. Antidumping Law, 30 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 369, 372-73 (1999).
138. BHALA, supra note 55, at 603.
139. Id.
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home prices of products and production factors, depend on such fac-
tors.1 40 After the Executive Branch and Congress made various attempts in
the 1960s and 1970s to deal with such problems in dumping investigations
from Communist countries,141 the 1988 Trade Act chose the "factors of
production approach" as the preferred approach.142 This method simu-
lates or "constructs" the fair price from factor input prices in some other
"surrogate" country.143
This use of "constructed" or "surrogate"-based prices shows the poten-
tial for triggering a particularly potent antidumping remedy. The United
States has considerable discretion, by its choice of surrogate countries, in
constructing either a high or a low "fair" price. 144 Other aspects, such as
the flawed nature of data from the chosen surrogate countries, increase the
discretion involved.' 45 Effectively, for a nonmarket economy like China,
the United States comes close to being able to set tariff levels based on
what it would take some competing country-one with higher costs than
China-to produce the product. This remedy, much-criticized in its appli-
cation as to China by free-trade enthusiasts, 146 potentially puts a great
amount of unilaterally invokable power in Congress' hands. Congress'
ability to take a proactive stance on antidumping further adds to the poten-
tial for a powerful antidumping remedy. Congress may direct the Adminis-
tration, in a triggered situation, not to await industry complaints, but to
survey important industries and proceed with antidumping remedies even
without the industry asking for such an action.
Similarly, Congress enacted the first general countervailing duty
(CVD) statute in 1897,147 and both the GATT and the WTO recognized the
right of countries to enforce such laws. When a foreign government subsi-
dizes a specific exporting industry, the United States will impose a coun-
tervailing duty.148 In 1986, the Federal Circuit found that the CVD statute
did not apply in general to nonmarket economies, as those economies pos-
sess so many distortions that a specific subsidy could not be discerned;
therefore, only antidumping laws could be applied in such circum-
stances.1 49 For NMEs in transition to capitalism, the Commerce Depart-
140. Robert H. Lantz, The Search for Consistency: Treatment of Nonmarket Economies
in Transition Under United States Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 10 Am. U.J.
INT'L L. & PoL'Y 993, 1002-07 (1995).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (c).
144. Alford, supra note 12, at 90-95.
145. John H.Jackson, State Trading and Nonmarket Economies, 23 INT'L LAw. 891, 906-
07 (1989).
146. Luke P. Bellocchi, The Effects of and Trends in Executive Policy and Court of Inter-
national Trade (CIT) Decisions Concerning Antidumping and the Non-Market Economy
(NME) of the People's Republic of China, 10 N.Y. INf'L L. REv. 177 (1997).
147. See generally Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443 (1978) (interpret-
ing CVD under § 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930).
148. Sanghan Wang, U.S. Trade Laws Concerning Nonmarket Economies Revisited for
Fairness and Consistency, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 593, 594-97 (1996).
149. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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ment thereafter developed the Market Oriented Industry (MOI) approach.
This approach applied not to the economy as a whole, but only to specific
sectors within the economy for which the factor inputs had market-deter-
mined prices. 150 In that case, the CVD statute applies and factor input
pricing sometimes can be used in such antidumping cases.' 51
The emerging law regarding NMEs had a practical as well as theoreti-
cal interest with respect to China. In the 1990s, the number of antidump-
ing cases involving China increased dramatically, with China taking
Japan's place after 1994 as the leading respondent country under U.S.
laws.152 From 1987 through 1996, the United States initiated 45
antidumping actions against China.153 Greg Mastel summarized the basic
reasons for this growth: "The combination of no clear cost structure, pres-
sure to export, and a demand for hard currency creates a powerful incen-
tive to dump exports in foreign markets." 154 Intriguingly, China is also the
most frequently cited NME respondent country in Europe, despite the
proximity and significance of Russia and the former Soviet bloc. 155
Chinese officials claim that $10 billion of China's $70 billion worth of
exports a year to the United States are goods that fall under U.S. antidump-
ing orders-such as steel, bicycles, honey, and mushrooms. 156 China's
opposition to the operation of the antidumping statute was one of the last
and most serious disagreements in the WTO Accession Agreement negotia-
tions.' 57 When Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji stepped in at the last moment
and dramatically compromised the points necessary for agreement, he con-
ceded that U.S. NME antidumping procedures could continue to apply to
China for fifteen more years; this was cited by National Security Adviser
Sandy Berger as a major selling point for the agreement. 158
With the WTO's antidumping article, the United States has flexibility
in the methodology it employs when handling dumping cases. With China
accepting, in the accession agreement, the continuation of its status as an
NME, the United States can determine a fair price for Chinese products
based on the prices of factor inputs of that product in another country. 159
Moreover, Congress may facilitate the application of CVD law to Chinese
imports by finding the pertinent production subsidies-like SOE subsidiza-
150. For a fuller description of the MOI approach, see Lantz, supra note 140, at 1042-
48. The Uruguay Round produced a change in the international subsidy law, recog-
nized by Congress in replacing section 303 in the prior CVD statute with section 262 of
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which requires an injury test along with the previ-
ous criteria. Id. at 1019, 1029.
151. Laroski, supra note 137, at 378-79.
152. John Pomfret, Trade Deal Brings Renewed Light to a Chinese Candlemaker, WASH.
PosT, Nov. 17, 1999, at A23, A25.
153. Tang Xiaobing, China's Economic System and Its New Role in the World Economy,
in CHINA IN THE WORLD TRADING SYsTEM, supra note 119, at 53, 59.
154. GREG MASTEL, AN TDUMPING LAws AND THE U.S. ECONOMY 58 (1998).
155. Id. at 118.
156. Pomfret, supra note 152, at A25.
157. Id.
158. Id. at A23.
159. See Lantz, supra note 140.
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tion-sufficiently isolatable to furnish a basis for a CVD remedy.160
If left to private parties to initiate, the antidumping provision and CVD
law may not affect trade with China more than past law has done so. 161
However, in a Sino 301 provision, Congress could mandate that if its future
review of trade and other relations with China warrants a triggering of
potent tools and remedies, the antidumping provision and CVD law could
be triggered in a wholesale way. That is, the law could require USTR to list
all products that are domestically produced for which Chinese imports are
priced above the levels in some comparable third country, with a presump-
tive finding that the Chinese imports are priced so as to justify an
antidumping remedy. Sino 301 could also require USTR to establish a
basis for a CVD remedy for Chinese subsidies, with a presumptive finding
that subsidies, as in the case of SOEs, justify a CVD remedy. The combina-
tion of USTR proactive action and justifiable presumptions with regard to
the Chinese economy, would make the enactment of a Congressional trig-
ger a matter of considerable importance while staying within the law of the
WTO and the 1999 accession agreement.
2. Import Surge Safeguards
The China-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement contains a major Chinese con-
cession for another potentially potent American trade tool: a "safeguard"
against import surges apparently intended to be exceptionally available.162
Appreciating the provision's potential as a trade tool requires tracing the
history of the import surge "safeguard," also known as the "escape clause"
and "Section 201."163
In the 1940s, the wave of U.S. commitment to trade agreements,
among other international commitments, contained a reservation of politi-
cal importance in securing Congress' agreement. 164 Leading up to Article
XIX of the GATT in 1947, the United States insisted on the ability to with-
draw or modify trade barrier concessions that led to products being
imported in increased quantities that in turn caused or threatened serious
injury to domestic producers. 165 American trade law enshrined this pro-
tection in what became Section 201, with amendments in 1962, 1974,
1984, 1988, and 1994.166 Section 201 goes beyond antidumping relief in
nominal availability, for it requires no showing that any exporting country
or countries have engaged in "unfair" pricing, only that their exports have
160. See generally id. at 1049-57 (reviewing a diverse array of potential approaches for
the application of CVD law to nonmarket economies in transition such as China).
161. See Pomfret, supra note 152 (noting that Chinese exports to the United States
have grown despite U.S. law such as antidumping remedies); MASTEL, supra note 154
(same).
162. China-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement, supra note 1.
163. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-53; BHALA, supra note 55, at 905 (providing a description of,
and synonyms for, section 201).
164. BIL-_A, supra note 55, at 883-84.
165. For the 1940s history leading up to Article XIX of GATT 1947, see id.
166. Id. at 884; Paul C. Rosenthal & Robin H. Gilbert, The 1988 Amendments to Sec-
tion 201: It Isn't Just for Import Relief Anymore, 20 LAW & PoL'y INT'L Bus. 403 (1989).
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the specified untoward effect. 167
In practice, the United States has made little use of safeguard
actions. 168 Accordingly, in the Uruguay Round, the United States pressed
for, and obtained, significant narrowing of the use of safeguards for
imports from market countries.' 69 The Agreement sets a high threshold:
the domestic industry must face "serious injury"; procedural limits must
exist in the form of cooling-off periods and sunsets for safeguard acti6ns;
and cut-backs on restraint agreements that have become the bi- or multilat-
eral alter egos of the unilateral safeguard action must be present. 170
Meanwhile, however, both international trading law and Congress
have long established models for product-specific safeguards vis-A-vis
China. In the 1950s and 1960s, when Poland, Romania, and Hungary
sought membership in the world trading system, the United States had
political reasons to support them, but Europe and other GATT members
feared a deluge of subsidized exports. 17 1 As a solution, their accession
agreements had low thresholds for safeguard actions that effectively
allowed temporary import limits upon their exports if those disrupted or
threatened to disrupt the markets for those products in the importing
nations. 172
Congress codified such an arrangement in the Trade Act of 1974,
enacted in the expectation of a major trade opening with the Soviet Union.
Section 406 provides relief from imports from Communist countries based
only on a determination that the imports are disrupting the U.S. mar-
ket.173 It requires only a showing of "material" injury (rather than the
"serious" injury of Section 201) and the market disruption need only be a
167. Thus, for running counter to trade liberalization, Section 201 had both economic
and political justifications. In economics terms, import surge relief allows domestic
industries to either adjust to regain competitiveness or to adjust to a shrinking market
share in an orderly manner. Politically, import surge relief both allows the United
States, like other cautious countries, to enter into otherwise worrisomely rigid trade
liberalization undertakings. If such undertakings produce a protectionist backlash, sec-
tion 201 provides a unilateral safety valve. Sykes, supra note 14, at 273 (proposing the
"Safety Valve Hypothesis").
168. During the period from the Tokyo Round (1979) to the Uruguay Round (1994),
the United States used safeguards only four times, while the European Communities
used them eighteen times (of which thirteen involved processed foodstuffs, clearly a
sensitive point for the EC). BHALA, supra note 55, at 890.
169. Notably, the Uruguay Round "Agreement on Safeguards" provides that safeguard
actions must be applied against imports of the particular product from all sources,
meaning that safeguards affect imports on a nonselective or "most favored nation" basis,
rather than being directed only against selected countries as are antidumping remedies.
See sources cited supra note 15 (particularly Article 2(2) of the Agreement on
Safeguards).
170. Ernesto M. Hizon, The Safeguard Measure/VER Dilemma: The Jeltyll and Hyde of
Trade Protection, 15 Nw. J. Ir'L L. & Bus. 105, 162-67 (1994).
171. MAsm_, supra note 121, at 182-85 (1997).
172. Id.
173. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2436, 2251.
Vol. 34
2001 Sino 301
"significant" cause of injury rather than a "substantial" cause.174
Observers have long anticipated the safeguard issue to be one of the
major final questions in China's WTO accession.175 China had to make
commitments to the U.S. textile and steel industries precisely on this sub-
ject.176 The system created by the China-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement,
as does Congress's NTR legislation, implements Section 201 in a forceful
way. 177 It allows a "provisional" safeguard pursuant to a "preliminary"
determination, for a period of up to 200 days. 178 This is a rare instance of
U.S. summary power to utilize a tool against Chinese imports. The provi-
sion makes apparent the expectation that the safeguard measure can result
from Chinese imports that increase on either a relative or an absolute basis.
China can retaliate only if the measure remains in effect for more than two
to three years. 179
If left to private parties to initiate, the safeguard provision may not
have much impact on trade with China. However, in a Sino 301 provision,
Congress could provide that if its future review of trade and other relations
with China warrants a triggering of potent tools and remedies, the safe-
guard provision could be triggered in a wholesale way. That is, USTR
could be required to list all products that are domestically produced for
which Chinese imports have recently increased, with a presumptive finding
that the Chinese imports have done so in ways justifying a safeguard
action. The special importance of the safeguard action lies in its express
linkage both with a summary provisional remedy and with encouragement
for China to enter a bilateral restraint agreement in response to safeguard
actions.
3. Retaliation for Chinese Failures to Achieve Trade Liberalization
Benchmarks
Traditionally, the various Section 301 mechanisms-regular, special, and
super-retaliate against other nations for their failures in trade liberaliza-
tion. They differ from antidumping and safeguard remedies, which empha-
174. Jeffrey S. Neeley, Nonmarket Economy Import Regulation: From Bad to Worse, 20
LAw & POL'Y INr'L Bus. 529, 536 (1989). For a discussion of the differences in stan-
dards, see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576-100, at 690-91 (1988).
175. Besides the just-described issue of the product-specific safeguard, the negotia-
tions included the companion issue of a possible "general" safeguard, which would have
allowed the United States to exit the accession agreement on a general basis if unsatis-
fied with its operation. Frederic M. Abbott, Reflection Paper on China in the World Trad-
ing System: Defining the Principles of Engagement, in CHINA IN THE WORLD TRADING
SYsTEM, supra note 119, at 1, 21. China adamantly opposed both types of safeguard.
Jeffrey L. Gertler, The Process of China's Accession to the World Trade Organization, in
CHINA IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 119, at 65, 71. In the final negotia-
tions, China apparently avoided a general safeguard provision, but at the price of giving
the United States a powerful product-specific safeguard. See China-U.S. WTO Accession
Agreement, supra note 1.
176. GROOMBRIDGE & BAImELD, supra note 16, at 46.
177. China-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement, supra note 1 (section on "Protocol Lan-
guage, Product-Specific Safeguard").
178. Id.
179. Id.
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size the effects of foreign exports on the open U.S. market, by focusing on
the effects of closed foreign markets on U.S. exports.
By analogy, a Sino 301 provision could provide for trade remedies
against China for its failure to open its markets by fulfilling trade liberaliza-
tion obligations, such as an end to local protectionism. In the simplest and
least debatable way, Congress could provide that if China violates the
express terms of its 1999 WTO Accession Agreement, and the United
States takes the proper steps under the WTO's dispute settlement rules, the
USTR could find China noncompliant. Congress might provide the formu-
lae for determining appropriate retaliatory sanctions, such as mechanisms
for quantifying retaliatory import quotas or tariffs for Chinese imports
(withdrawal of previous trade concessions toward China by the United
States). If, within fifteen months, China does not correct the noncompli-
ance, the USTR may administer those sanctions, again assuming the proper
steps under the WTO's dispute settlement rules are taken. 180
The problem comes in the set-up of an enhanced retaliatory system as
a Sino 301. Serious questions begin to arise as Congress moves beyond the
express terms of the 1999 WTO Accession Agreement or beyond what is
procedurally clearly acceptable to the WTO. As discussed below, Congress
might include in a Sino 301 provision establishing benchmarks how much
progress China should make each year toward compliance with each major
category of undertakings in the accession agreement. However, complica-
tions may arise. China might disagree with those benchmarks. Congress
might frame the retaliation provisions in ways that make it difficult,
although not impossible, for the Administration both to implement them
and to follow all the timing and procedural steps of the WTO's dispute
settlement rules. Further, China might seize on, and disagree with, those
aspects.
In dimensions such as these, the Congressional framers of a Sino 301
provision must accommodate these problems by inserting some flexibility,
particularly at the beginning of the U.S. experience with China's WTO
accession. The history of the existing 301 system teaches that it is valuable
to have a system in place, even if imperfect, and then to learn from experi-
ence and take advantage of periodic opportunities to amend the Section
301 provision. It may be impossible to predict in advance which is better:
for Congress to pin down both USTR and China with specificity without
discretion and with maximal requirements and sanctions, or for Congress
to leave more room for USTR and China, somewhat diluting the threat of
the annual review to increase its compatibility with the WTO system. Suc-
cessive statutes over the years have refined the 301 system, including
arranging its accommodation with the Uruguay Round Agreements in
1994.181 Flexibility in the first enactment of a Sino 301 would not pre-
180. See generally Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An
Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1999) (describing how the
WTO dispute settlement rules have been working in practice).
181. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing enactments of 1974,
1984, 1988, and 1994).
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dude tightening and toughening it if future experience should call for such
changes.
4. Encouraged Negotiation of Sino-American Restraint Agreements
The availability of potent tools-the antidumping, CVD, and safeguard
actions, and retaliation for trade liberalization shortcomings in opening
China's own market-sets the stage for the mechanism that would make
the Sino 301 system most practical. In past decades, high-level trade dis-
putes, such as between the United States and Japan or the United States
and the European Community, have often resulted not in sanction wars but
in restraint agreements. 182 Congress has encouraged this development, for
example, by ending an antidumping case with a suspension agreement.183
As previously described, the two Special 301 proceedings against
China for intellectual property issues ended in the creation of 1992 and
1995 MOUs.18 4 Moreover, not only is China a party to perhaps one of the
most important multilateral restraint agreements, the Textile Agree-
ment,185 but the China-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement expressly pre-
serves and maintains China's place in that restraint agreement until
2008.186 In sum, China and the USTR have demonstrated they can negoti-
ate an agreement under pressure from the U.S. Congress.
If Congress ever appeared close to triggering a Sino 301 provision,
China would have a host of reasons to negotiate a bilateral trade restraint
agreement with the United States rather than either challenge the United
States before the WTO, or unilaterally retaliate. First, the Sino 301 provi-
sion focuses on China's own shortcomings in trade liberalization. This is
the weakest ground for China to attack. China's own acceptance (in the
1999 accession agreement) of such provisions as the continuation of its
NME status for antidumping and import surge safeguard purposes would
undermine such an attack. The preceding discussion shows how unlikely
it is that China can quickly and smoothly accomplish the hardest parts of
trade liberalization.' 8 7 And, for purposes of appeals to various watching
publics-the Chinese people, third countries, and the American people, to
name a few-China's government cannot contend that trade liberalization
obligations are imposed upon it in the same manner as it contends human
rights obligations are. China's government can hardly contend trade liber-
alization has been thrust upon it when it has vigorously sought entry into
the WTO; its trade liberalization commitments to enter the WTO, and their
related problems, are perhaps even less of a secret within China than
abroad.
Second, by negotiating a bilateral trade restraint agreement, Beijing
keeps control of the form of trade imposition. It can seek to reconcile U.S.
182. GROOMBRIDGE & BAmFELD, supra note 16, at 55-56.
183. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1)(D); Cooper, supra note 53, at 1005.
184. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
185. JAcKSON Er AL., supra note 5, at 1184-90.
186. China-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement, supra note 1.
187. See supra notes 91-135 and accompanying text.
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demands with its own plans. If it must accept trade curbs, it can negotiate
them in the form in which it can best handle them.
Third, the same powerful inducements exist for this as for all other
suspension agreements. If the United States unilaterally imposes remedies,
tariffs, or their equivalents on Chinese exports to the United States, the
U.S. government pockets the resulting price increases faced by U.S. cus-
tomers. In contrast, if China negotiates a bilateral trade restraint regime
that it itself administers, it can either ration the profitable sales quotas
among its own producers or rake off the surpluses with an export tax.
Either way, it can render the U.S. trade imposition less intolerable.
C. Sino 301 Triggering Processes
In setting up a Sino 301 process, there are a number of goals. The provi-
sion should assign orderly roles to the USTR and to Congress. A large role
for the USTR in determining where China has fallen short in trade liberali-
zation, and what could appropriately occur in response, should harmonize
the operation of the process with the WTO rules in much the same way as
does the existing 301 system. The significant role played by Congress
should bring about the virtues of the annual MFN debate on trade and
other relations with China, namely, a focus for a national U.S. debate at all
levels with hearings, press coverage, and Congressional votes.
1. Initial Tasking of USTR
A Sino 301 provision would set a large initial (or "first round") task for
USTR. Initially, USTR should develop benchmarks for China's annual or
periodic progress toward fulfillment of each of its major categories of trade
liberalization commitments. Congressional authors of a Sino 301 could
adumbrate such benchmarks in their legislative history. Some long-term
commitments obligate China to make interim progress. For example, one
major sector covered by the China-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement consists
of insurance. 188 China committed itself to expanding the scope of activi-
ties for foreign insurers to include group, health, and pension lines of
insurance, to be phased in over a five year period.' 8 9 Industry observers
expressed skepticism, anticipating unchanged Chinese attitudes of resis-
tance against allowing foreign insurers.190
Pursuant to the Sino 301 provision, USTR would assign a set of
benchmarks for assessing Chinese progress toward full opening of group,
health, and pension lines of insurance. While not requiring excessive pro-
gress from the outset, it would also not leave the United States watching in
frustration four years into the accession period while little or no Chinese
progress occurs. To the extent that the Chinese themselves announce effec-
188. China-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement, supra note 1 (section entitled "Insur-
ance"). For a discussion of the subject of benchmarking for China's accession to the
WTO, see Alexandroff, supra note 18.
189. China-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement, supra note 1.
190. Shai Oster, Insurance Industry Experts View China's Market Opening Plans with
Skepticism, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 136 (Jan. 17, 2000).
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tive plans for stepwise fulfillment of their pledges, weight and deference
would be given to the Chinese plans, but if the Chinese remain vague about
how they will fulfill their pledges, benchmarking would prevent this from
becoming a device for simple delay and evasion of responsibility by the
Chinese during the next few years. The government would have to estab-
lish an on-going network of commercial information analysis for assessing
Chinese progress in each subsector, and not merely passively await indus-
try complaints. 191
Taking long-term commitments and establishing benchmarks presents
subtle challenges with regard to China's other commitments. How, for
example, does one benchmark China's obligation to achieve transparency
in its trade-related regulating? Quantification of future progress is not
easy. A concept worth exploring is that of finding "yardsticks"-compari-
sons-both in China itself and in other countries 192
Besides benchmarking, the U.S. government would have to take steps
to become more proactive in its assessment of the potential for antidump-
ing, countervailing duty, and safeguard actions. Just as it should assess
Chinese progress in each subsector, so it should have the rudiments of an
overall assessment for each sector of the potential for such actions. Worth
considering is the concept of "indicators"-average or significant products
that give an indication of how the sector is doing.193
2. Annual Review
The Sino 301 provision would arrange an annual cycle starting with the
USTR's report on Chinese progress and problems. The report would com-
pare progress in trade liberalization with the previously established
benchmarks. It would also report on the potential for antidumping, coun-
tervailing duty, and safeguard problems.
191. The Clinton Administration had already asked for funding to assign trade com-
pliance personnel to China. Gary G. Yerkey & Rossella Brevetti, Administration Asks for
$21.2 Million for New Trade Compliance Initiative, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 229 (Feb. 10,
2000). In fact, something of a network might develop of American-employed China-
based consultants, much as large-scale regulatory initiatives of the past, for example, the
devising of air and water pollution standards, have depended upon rapid assembly of
economy-wide information by such networks domestically.
192. At one end of the spectrum, the ultimate goal could consist of the degree of
transparency found in European Union trade regulation; at the other end of the spec-
trum, China has itself made limited progress in some spheres, such as in the promulga-
tion of codes; and in the middle, Hong Kong and the nearby regions it influences
represent a valuable yardstick, since trade between them has flourished-albeit with
some nontransparency, arbitrariness, and corruption on the Chinese side in matters
such as customs valuation. See generally Ostry, supra note 17 (analyzing the trans-
parency issue with regard to China).
193. For such indicators, comparisons of available Chinese and American data, with
data from suitable third countries, should allow an assessment of whether Chinese
export prices are reasonable, the significance of lingering subsidies such as the state-
owned industry system, and its commercially unjustified bank loans, and the impact on
domestic American production. See generally Lantz, supra note 140, at 1038-59 (discuss-
ing the comparisons of available data that allow an assessment of Chinese progress in
each sector in the current processes regarding antidumping and countervailing duty
laws).
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The annual report would initiate lines of activity by the Administra-
tion and in Congress. For its part, the Administration would follow the
established lines of the Section 301 system by gathering information for an
annual report. It would discuss tentative findings about problems with
China, conduct further investigations preliminary to U.S. action, and pre-
pare to initiate WTO dispute settlement proceedings. Besides the greater
pressure from benchmarking and evaluating the previous years' accumu-
lated record, the Administration would find reason for these steps beyond
the 301 system as it would look over its shoulder at Congressional activity,
hoping to head off any extreme Congressional backlash.
For its part, Congress would follow a process similar to its annual
MFN review. That is, Congressional committees would hold hearings on
trade and other relations with China. Far from focusing purely, as the
USTR would, on the trade issues with China, these hearings, and related
debates in committees, in the press, and on the legislative floor, might well
focus largely on other relations with China. It would not be surprising for
human rights issues ranging from prison labor to Tibet and religious free-
dom to press censorship to receive prominent attention. So, too, whatever
international relations issues between China and the United States capture
attention generally, from Taiwan to proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and from alleged espionage to Pacific security, would receive
prominent attention.
At a culminating point each year, the House and Senate would have a
"fast track" opportunity to adopt a joint resolution on Chinese failure to
fulfill trade liberalization pledges. Congressional sponsors of the resolu-
tion would restrict its provisions solely to the trade problems of the kind
discussed in the USTR report. The resolution would, if enacted, declare
China in substantial noncompliance with its trade liberalization obliga-
tions. It would trigger, in a binding way, the maximum resort to the previ-
ously discussed remedies: antidumping, countervailing duty, safeguard
actions, and retaliation of the traditional Section 301 kind consistent with
the WTO. The resolution might also provide that the Administration could
negotiate for China voluntarily to agree to impose curbs on its own trade in
an amount corresponding to these remedies, subject perhaps to an early
second vote in Congress to reinstate the Sino 301 remedies if Congress
were unsatisfied by the voluntary restraint agreement.
Quite likely, just as Congress never did use the annual MFN review to
take away China's MFN status, so Congress would experience much politi-
cal pressure not to vote a Sino 301 resolution. The likelihood of Congress
not passing a triggering resolution would depend on the sound judgment
of a majority of the House of Representatives and the Senate. This is why
coupling a vote on a very strong trade remedies resolution with hearings
and debates on other relations with China is not problematic. Invocation
of maximum trade remedies against China is a step that Congress would
not, and should not, take merely because of dissatisfaction with China for
lack of prompt and smooth fulfillment of its trade liberalization promises.
The United States has too much of a stake in free trade, and too much
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sympathy for the Chinese people's striving to overcome their legacy of
underdevelopment and Maoist misguidance, to invoke its maximum trade
remedies for the minimum possible reason under international economic
law. Rather, only if events that forfeit U.S. domestic support on other
issues-such as international relations and human rights-occur, should
so potent a step be considered.
III. The Upholding of a Sino 301 Provision Based on the WTO "301
Panel" Decision
If Congress enacts a Sino 301 provision, China could take its opposition to
that mechanism to the WTO. China would contend, in a form of a chal-
lenge which the WTO finds understandable and cognizable, that the
United States enacted a law inconsistent with recognition of China's rights
pursuant to the WTO rules. Analyzing what the WTO would decide in
such a case allows us to decide whether the United States would violate its
undertakings with respect to China and the world trading community by
enacting such a provision. This is the proper question, rather than whether
the United States should make use of such a provision after enactment. All
the good reasons that free-trade enthusiasts could enunciate-legal, eco-
nomic, political, and diplomatic-not to trigger a Sino 301 provision prop-
erly come before Congress during such a mechanism's annual review, and
appropriately receive consideration in that forum and at that time. At this
point, the question is not whether it is wise to trigger a Sino 301 provision,
but whether it violates the WTO rules to have such a mechanism at all.
The WTO panel that addressed the EU complaint against Section 301
provides an irivaluable route through the issues that the WTO would
address regarding a Sino 301 provision. 194 In that case, the EU asked for a
WTO panel in January 1999.195 Although it was the banana dispute in
particular that drove the EU to file such a complaint, the EU challenged the
Section 301 system broadly rather than focusing on the banana dispute or
any other particular instance of the Section 301 system operation.
In its complaint, the EU challenged that the Section 301 system
imposes "strict time limits within which unilateral determinations must be
made and trade sanctions must be taken."196 The Section 301 system's
time limits for unilateral U.S. determinations and actions assertedly did
not allow compliance with the WTO DSU rules and procedures. DSU must
make multilateral findings and follow procedures for suspensions of con-
cessions before the United States may properly take action. 197 Presented
differently, the EU argued that the historical deal between the EU (and
others) and the United States that underlies the Uruguay Round resulted in
the United States receiving a stronger WTO dispute resolution system in
194. WTO 301 Panel Decision, supra note 20, at 4.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. Of course, the argument includes much more than this one sentence conveys.
For the panel's outline of the EC's arguments and the United States' counterarguments,
see id. at 9-223.
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return for the EU obtaining an abandonment by the United States of its
Section 301 approach of unilateral action. 198
China would have a similar challenge to a Sino 301 available to it. A
Sino 301 provision would time Congress' adoption of a triggering resolu-
tion, finding violation of U.S. rights and setting in motion the actions
against trade with China fairly quickly. China would argue that Congress
would thereby preclude compliance with the DSU rules and procedures, by
which the DSU must make multilateral findings before the United States
may do so unilaterally, and the DSU must seek and fail to obtain compli-
ance before the United States may properly take retaliatory actions.
Presented differently, China would say that it made major commitments in
its accession agreement with the United States, and accepted WTO disci-
plines, in return for the United States no longer treating disputes using
means outside the WTO system, that is, with such unilateral mechanisms
as a Sino 301.
The WTO 301 Panel Decision gave serious consideration to the EU
argument. In a much-quoted interim analytic step, it noted that "[u]nder
[the DSU's] Article 23 the US promised ... specifically not to resort to
unilateral measures," while in the section 301 system, "in contrast, the US
statutorily reserves the right to do so." 199 Hence, "because of that, the
statutory language of Section 304 constitutes a prima facie violation of
[WTO] Article 23.2(a)."200 What saved the 301 system, the WTO panel
went on to say, consisted of the undertakings by the Administration in
1994-in the Statement of Administrative Action, accepted by the Congress
as binding-and afterwards. 201
WTO panel took as key Administration statements that emphasized
the existence of "broad discretion"20 2 under the Section 301 system. This
discretionary aspect permits abstention from reaching findings about other
countries' violations prior to commencement of multilateral proceedings
under the DSU. 20 3 Similarly, the Administration stressed the existence of
"wide discretion" under the Section 301 system, even after such findings,
permitting the 301 system not to reach the point of retaliatory action for
other countries' failure to come into compliance prior to further multilat-
eral authorization under the DSU. Based on this discretion to await the
workings of the DSU, the panel "conclude[d] that those aspects of Sections
301-310 of the US Trade Act brought before us in this dispute are not
inconsistent with US obligations under the WTO."204
The panel's ultimate rejection of the EU challenge to Section 301 sug-
gests that, similarly, a Sino 301 provision would survive a challenge by
China. This would hold true so long as the Sino 301 provision, like Section
198. Id. at 292.
199. Id. at 311.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 318.
203. Id. at 314-18.
204. Id. at 330.
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301, left open, by elements of procedural timing discretion at some stages,
the possibility that the United States would present in a WTO forum, and
win, its contentions about Chinese violations and noncompliance and that
the United States would leave time for this to occur before taking retalia-
tory actions.
For several reasons, a Sino 301 provision could leave these possibili-
ties open without losing its potency as a Congressionally-invoked tool.
First, the antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard actions follow
their own procedures, without having to wait for DSU's more complex mul-
tilateral processes. The 1990s have shown the enormous potential for such
actions, and the China-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement confirmed, if not
enhanced, that potential for the next dozen or fifteen years. Until now,
USTR has employed those remedies in a reactive way, in response to
prompting by affected domestic industries. A Sino 301 statute, which
would pave the way for a proactive, maximum use of those remedies, would
provide many options to the United States following a Congressional sig-
nal. This would result in multilateral steps with a less delayed impact upon
Chinese trade.
Second, a Sino 301 provision could serve as a strong threat, backed by
a strong impact, even if it were to leave certain matters open or to leave
some discretion to the USTR. So long as China anticipates-and as
described previously, this is likely-that it cannot fully and smoothly com-
ply with its international obligations, then once Congress enacted a Sino
301 triggering resolution, the imposition of fully authorized sanctions
would be only a matter of time. China simply cannot cure such monumen-
tal problems as its local protectionism, its SOEs, and its legal procedures'
lack of transparency, in the relatively short time between when the United
States files a complaint and when the multilateral process is complete. The
critical point, on which the WTO does not take away from Congress the
initiative on unilateral decision-making, lies in the twin decisions to invoke
maximum remedies at the start and to set the level of retaliation at the
end.20 5 For example, if China falls short of achieving transparency, and
Congress triggers a full U.S. response, the United States would both initiate
the multilateral processes and, upon their completion, decide the matching
retaliation level.20 6 Unless China succeeds in complying with its obliga-
tions so completely as to avoid this outcome, this fate of its trading rela-
tionship with the United States will be inevitable and difficult to accept,
notwithstanding any delays.
205. "[I]n the event the United States wins a panel decision and the loser refuses to
comply, the United States could use Section 301 as authorized retaliation." William R.
Sprance, The World Trade Organization and United States' Sovereignty: The Political and
Procedural Realities of the System, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. Rev. 1225, 1256 (1998).
206. See sources cited supra note 15 (particularly Dispute Settlement Understanding,
art. 22.4). Article 22 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding puts down a few princi-
ples and procedures, but little more that matters than that "[t]he level of the suspension
of concessions or other obligations [i.e., the level of retaliation] authorized by the DSB
shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment." Id.
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Third, to close out a repeat theme of this article, it is simply not
expected that the outcome of this sequence would be either a unilaterally-
or multilaterally-authorized sanction. Rather, faced with either the pros-
pect or reality of a Congressional triggering resolution, China would nego-
tiate a bilateral trade restraint agreement with the United States. In effect,
it would admit that there are limits to how quickly it can comply with its
WTO and accession agreement obligations, and that if the United States
wishes to use those limits as a ground to curb trade with China, China
knows its interests lie in negotiating the sectors, scale, and method of the
curbing, rather than simply resisting and absorbing the trade blows
inflicted by the United States.
For example, suppose that early in the year 2005, Beijing were to take
some action with respect to human rights that had an even greater negative
effect on world and U.S. opinion than Tienanmen Square. When 'the
annual USTR report, laying out the current level of Chinese trade obliga-
tion compliance problems, came before Congress that year, suppose Con-
gress this time felt angry enough to adopt a Sino 301 triggering resolution.
This is what almost happened in 1989 when the House (but not the Sen-
ate) adopted the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. 20 7 In short order, the
Congressional vote of 2005 would trigger increased antidumping, counter-
vailing duty, and safeguard actions, as well as the commencement of pro-
ceedings before WTO panels regarding each U.S. allegation of Chinese
failure to come into compliance with agreement obligations.
Rather than have to absorb a series of blows over which it would have
relatively little control, Beijing would find it better to negotiate an agree-
ment. Under such a bilateral trade restraint agreement, China would
accept a sizable curb in trade between the United States and itself-say, a
reduction of a substantial percentage from the level in 2004, to last some
definite but fixed time period. China would administer this curb itself,
allocating internally the trade reduction.20 8
For all the controversy it engenders both abroad and within U.S.
domestic political pro-free-trade circles, the 301 system does serve as a
major part of the structure and process for American debate over trade
relations with othernations. The question is whether an extension of the
301 system could provide adequate structure to the U.S. debate over trade
and other relations with China. The answer is yes.
207. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
208. As a commentator analyzed the 1999 prospect of suspension agreements on
steel: "suspension agreements replace duties... with negotiated quotas ....
... If tariffs are imposed, the U.S. treasury captures those [economic] rents. If, however,
quotas are used, the foreign companies that raise their prices capture them." Greg Mas-
tel, Foreign Aid in the Guise of Steel Pacts, J. CoM., July 23, 1999, at 6.
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Conclusion
A. Relations with China
The ultimate question is whether having an annual Sino 301 process in the
United States helps, or hurts, relations with China. From the perspective
of Beijing's leaders, annual Congressional debates are trouble, plain and
simple. Such debates trap Beijing in the uncomfortable position of being
subjected to periodic criticism and stirring-up of antagonism. Beijing
gains nothing by remaining, year after year, a target of attack in U.S. polit-
ics. On the other hand, China-critics avow that their criticisms, and the
need for U.S. review of trade and other relations with China, derive from
the faults of the Beijing regime, and that such international attention is for
the benefit, not the harm, of the Chinese people. 20 9 For China-critics, criti-
cism of the regime is not a criticism of the nation, and provides the only
possible substitute for the domestic democratic forum denied by the
regime.
From the U.S. side, the picture is somewhat clearer. It is the larger set
of issues regarding relations, which transcend trade, that most justify a
Sino 301 process. 2 10 U.S. relations with China involve very large elements
both of hope and of peril in the coming years. On the side of hope, China's
fast-growing economy offers the prospect of valuable trade and investment.
China can become a source of stability in Asian and Pacific affairs, for
China has not historically sought to project power far from its homeland.
On the other hand, the experience of trade dealings with China for the
past two decades shows that America must press hard for favorable terms,
or else it will end up with unfavorable ones. While the accession agree-
ment was beneficial for the United States, as discussed above, China will
face difficulties in fulfilling its accession agreement commitments.
211
More importantly, beyond purely economic consideratins, fueling China's
growth may well produce strategic national security problems with respect
to the stability of Asian and Pacific affairs. With growing industrial might
and technological sophistication, China will have more power than its
many weaker neighbors. China's view of what adjustments should follow
accordingly may clash with that of the rest of the world, particularly the
United States. 2 12
While this is an extremely abbreviated statement about an enormous
subject, no matter how briefly or fully one explores the matter, in the end,
the issue is reduced to a debate regarding the appropriate course the
209. MAsTEL, supra note 121, at 156-59.
210. See generally W. Gary Vause, Tibet to Tienanmen: Chinese Human Rights and the
United States Foreign Policy, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1575 (1989).
211. Greg Mastel, Clinton Made the Right Call on China and WTO, J. CoM., Oct. 15,
1999, at 6.
212. For a particularly strong treatment of this side, see generally RicHAR, D BERNSTIN,
THE COMING CONFLICT WITH CHINA (1997).
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United States should follow with China.213 In American politics, there can
be error in Congressional debate. For example, there was, in retrospect,
more hysteria than substance in the temporary "surge in anti-Chinese senti-
ment in Congress"'214 in April 1999 that delayed the China-U.S. WTO
Accession Agreement until year's end.2 15 However, a nation can only learn
of its mistakes by holding such debates, not by doing without them. If the
only U.S. interests in China concerned trade, the United States might con-
duct its discussions on this matter through the same channels that handle
other trade issues. But China matters too much to limit such debate to
ordinary trade matters alone. For all the pitfalls of the annual review pro-
cess, the United States allocates a generous portion of a precious commod-
ity-serious public and political attention-to relations with China. The
importance of those relations makes the allocation of that special attention
worthwhile.216
B. The American Balance in Trade Relations
In the past half-century, through international agreements and through its
own national policy, the United States, as much or more than any other
nation, has helped to develop the present system of legal management of
international trade. The United States has maintained a balance, albeit one
constantly in flux, between multilateral and unilateral approaches. On the
one hand, the United States helped establish the original GATT, led the
decades of successive rounds of negotiations that refined it, and helped to
culminate that half-century of evolution with the Uruguay Round agree-
ments and the creation of the WTO. All of this, not to mention the creation
of the regional trade pact of North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), shows a powerful and effective spirit of multilateralism. 217
China's inclusion in the WTO eliminates one of the major remaining obsta-
cles to knitting the world .economy together in a multilateral agreement
system.
On the other hand, U.S. own politics necessitate that it exhibit a con-
trasting element of unilateralism. This article discussed previously how
this meshes with a general contemporary balance in many contexts of
international relations between (Executive-led) engagement and commit-
213. For two of the many surveys in recent years, see CHINA JOINS THE WORLD: PRO-
GRESS AND PROSPECTS (Elizabeth Economy & Michael Oksenberg eds., 1999); LIVING WITH
CHINA: U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Ezra F. Vogel ed., 1997).
214. Steven Mufson & Robert G. Kaiser, Missed U.S.-China Deal Looms Large: Near-
Agreement in April May Prove Pivotal in WTO Talks, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1999, at Al;
see generally William V. Roth, Jr., Let China Join the WTO, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1999, at
A19 (chair of Senate Finance Committee disputing his party's criticisms of an accession
agreement with China even at the moment they proved temporarily decisive).
215. Bacon, supra note 8, at 370-73 (describing in retrospect the friction in 1999 in
Sino-U.S. trade relations and why the accession agreement at 1999's end was a positive
development).
216. See generally Jonathan Mirsky, Democratic Vistas?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 13,
1998, at 26.
217. See generally Kevin M. McDonald, The Unilateral Undermining of Conventional
International Trade Law Via Section 301, 7 J. IrNT'L L. & PRAc. 395 (1998).
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ment to international organizations and undertakings, and (Congressio-
nally-voiced) skepticism about those commitments.218 The rise of the
Section 301 system demonstrates the force of U.S. skepticism about the
adequacy of trade multilateralism. In the past decade, the 301 system per-
severed over strong foreign opposition in the Uruguay Round negotiations,
the Helms-Burton (as to Cuba) and the Iran/Libya Sanctions acts-two
1996 acts unilaterally threatening interference with other countries'
trade,2 19 the 1997 refusal to extend the "fast track" route to future trade
agreements, and the 1999 demonstrations in Seattle.220 Annual MFN
review of China, and the controversy over Chinese accession to the WTO,
applied this streak of skepticism about multilateralism in the specific con-
text of trade with China.
A serious record of misguided past unilateral American trade actions,
particularly in the context of China pursuant to the MFN review mecha-
nism, would support an effective argument against unilateralism in much
the same way that free-trade enthusiasts point to the Hawley-Smoot Tariff
of 1930 as an effective argument against protectionism. However, there is
no such record of misguided U.S. action regarding trade with China. Shrill,
sometimes ineffective, occasionally even hysterical debates have produced
no irreversible, mistaken actions. Thus trade debate, without trade mis-
takes, has been the rule. The annual MFN debates have drawn meaning
from having the potential to trigger a serious threat, and yet have not trig-
gered it or otherwise caused any serious disruption to the steady progress
in U.S.-China trade relations. This record of debate without mistakes
greatly undermines the case against finding a replacement mechanism for
giving meaning to the annual debates. A Sino 301 mechanism will allow
debate in a way that respects both the importance and controversiality of
trade relations with China and the newly-applicable international trade law
of the WTO rules and the accession agreement. Few subjects are worthier
of receiving such a share of U.S. public attention.
218. Tiefer, Adjusting Sovereignty, supra note 10.
219. Rufus H. Yerxa & Demetrios J. Marantis, Assessing the New WTO Dispute System:
A U.S. Perspective, 32 Irrr'L LAv. 795, 806 (1998).
220. For a reconceptualization and defense of such unilateralism in international eco-
nomic law, see Alan C. Swan, "Fairness" and "Reciprocity" in International Trade Section
301 and the Rule of Law, 16 Aiuz. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 37 (1999).

